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The current study explored the interaction of verbal ability and presentation order on
readers’ attitude formation when presented with two-sided arguments. Participants
read arguments for and against compulsory voting and genetic engineering, and
attitudes were assessed before and after reading the passages. Participants’ verbal
ability was measured, combining vocabulary knowledge and reading comprehension
skill. Results suggested that low verbal-ability participants were more persuaded by the
most recent set of arguments whereas high verbal-ability participants formed attitudes
independent of presentation order. Contrary to previous literature, individual differences
in the personality trait need for cognition did not interact with presentation order. The
results suggest that verbal ability is an important moderator of the effect of presentation
order when formulating opinions from complex prose.
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INTRODUCTION
Most of the issues considered to be important by modern societies tend to be highly controversial.
Using the case of food production and distribution as an example, proponents of genetic
engineering might argue that genetically engineered crops and livestock that are nutritious and
resistant to disease can play a key role in solving the world’s hunger problems. However, opponents
of this view might counterargue that interfering with natural evolution could lead to ecological
disasters and might eventually entail even more pronounced global food shortages. People often
arrive at a particular viewpoint on the basis of information acquired from written materials such as
magazines, newspapers, and books. Thus, it is important to understand how text characteristics
as well as individual characteristics of readers jointly contribute to the way in which opinions
are formed. Interestingly, although the strength of an argument can play an important role in
determining a reader’s response, there is evidence that the order in which arguments are presented
can play an important role as well. Further, these text-level features have been argued to interact
in specific ways with individual-level traits when readers are forming a particular attitude for a
debated topic (e.g., Petty et al., 2001). Of particular interest in the current study is how (a) the
order in which the arguments are presented, (b) readers’ verbal abilities, and (c) readers’ need
for cognition (an assessment of the general tendency for people to engage in and enjoy effortful
information-processing activity) interact in contexts in which individuals formulate opinions about
controversial issues presented in text.
A number of reading studies have reported that counterargumentation might have important
consequences on learning outcomes (e.g., Braasch et al., 2013; Wolfe et al., 2013). For example,
in addition to examining effects related to prior knowledge about a topic, Braasch et al. (2013)
explored the role of presenting differing perspectives on a certain physics principle when
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learning about science. The authors demonstrated that readers
were more likely to develop an accurate understanding of
the principle of airflow when they were presented with both
a popular misconception as well as an explicit and correct
refutation, compared to a situation where the correct conception
was repeated several times and highlighted as being correct.
These findings are consistent with Allen (1991), who found that
arguments accompanied by refutations of position-inconsistent
views are perceived as more persuasive than arguments that
simply present a specific position. This suggests that readers
do not simply “navigate past” views and perspectives they
ultimately deem to be unpersuasive, but might use them to
facilitate learning. One common feature of the studies outlined
above is that they focused on the learning of well-established
scientific principles. However, many issues important to modern
societies, including scientifically grounded ones, can be highly
controversial and do not have a single correct answer. In such
cases, individuals come to form their own subjective opinions
from the information they encounter.
The important role that the ordering of arguments plays in
forming one’s attitudes for a given issue was first recognized
by Lund (1924). Lund examined how the ordering of pro and
con arguments affected attitudes toward issues such as equality
in political rights, the implementation of protective tariffs,
and monogamy in marriage. Attitudes were measured before
participants read the arguments, after they read the first set of
arguments (either the pros or the cons), and after they read
the remaining arguments (both the pros and cons). Attitude
ratings consistently showed that the argument presented first had
the largest effect on readers’ final self-reported attitudes about
each of the three issues. In view of this pattern, Lund proposed
“the law of primacy in persuasion,” holding that arguments
presented first in a discussion tend to make a larger impact
compared to the arguments presented second. However, some of
the subsequent research reported the completely opposite effect
(e.g., Cromwell, 1950). For example, Cromwell explored order
effects on attitude change with regards to whether the federal
government should provide universal medical care and whether
the federal government should require arbitration of labor
disputes. Cromwell found that when the pro and con arguments
were both strong, the view presented second in a discussion had
a larger impact compared to the view presented first. When the
con and pro arguments regarding the same issue were both weak,
order did not have an effect on attitude change. The first attempt
to review literature on the topic (Hovland and Mandell, 1957)
pointed out that early studies differed on numerous dimensions,
including the specific attitude scales used, the timing of probes
for reader attitudes, and the perceived relevance of the topics. In
addition, given the inconsistent evidence, Hovland and Mandell
concluded that the law of primacy does not always apply, and
that there are likely other mechanisms that moderate ordering
effects when individuals are presented with two conflicting sides
of an argument. More recent investigations (outlined in the
next sections) have provided new insights about the possible
moderators.
One potential moderator of presentation order effects
explored in a number of past studies is need for cognition,
a personality trait that reflects the general tendency for
an individual to engage in and enjoy effortful information-
processing activity (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982; see also Cacioppo
et al., 1996; Petty et al., 2009). Several studies have argued that
need for cognition is a reliable moderator of order effects in
two-sided argumentation (e.g., Kassin et al., 1990; Haugtvedt
and Petty, 1992). More specifically, when presented with two
conflicting sides to an issue, individuals with high need-for-
cognition scores tend to be more influenced by the viewpoint
that was presented first compared to a second viewpoint (a
primacy effect), whereas those with low need-for-cognition
scores are persuaded more by the more recent viewpoint (a
recency effect). For example, Kassin et al. (1990) conducted a
mock jury study in which an ambiguous videotaped confession
was introduced by one side (defense or prosecution) along with a
set of arguments providing an interpretation of the confession as
being consistent with that side. Then, the opposing side presented
a statement arguing that the confession actually supported the
opposite position. Kassin et al. (1990) found that people scoring
high in need for cognition gave verdicts based on the initial
interpretation of the confession. In contrast, people scoring
low in need for cognition relied more on the more recently
presented reinterpretation of the confession (see Haugtvedt and
Petty, 1992, for similar findings). More recently, Qiu and Wang
(2011) investigated how consumers’ attitudes are affected by
the presentation order of negative and positive reviews on the
Internet. Consistent with Kassin et al.’s (1990) findings, the
authors observed that the attitudes of participants scoring high
in need for cognition reflected a primacy effect whereas those
scoring low in need for cognition showed a recency effect.
The order effects described above have been explained in
terms of differences in how low and high need-for-cognition
participants process information (Kassin et al., 1990; Haugtvedt
and Petty, 1992; Haugtvedt and Wegener, 1994; Petty et al.,
2001). Specifically, it is hypothesized that people who score high
on need-for-cognition measures are individuals who actively
process information and consequently are likely to form opinions
early and then engage in confirmatory hypothesis testing. This
early opinion is presumed to enable discounting of the later
(opposing) arguments. In contrast, people who score low on
need-for-cognition measure are individuals believed to engage
in less active forms of thinking and, consequently, do not form
opinions early. As a result, these individuals are more likely to
make decisions only when prompted to do so, and base these
decisions on whatever information is most recent and accessible.
An important aspect of the studies to date on this topic is
that the arguments are usually presented in complex written or
spoken prose. Presumably, the process of formulating attitudes
from such materials requires the comprehension and integration
of multiple points of view presented in the discourse. A number
of authors have investigated how learners combine information
from multiple (sometimes contradictory) sources to arrive at
a coherent interpretation of a topic (e.g., Wiley et al., 2009;
Griffin et al., 2012). For instance, Wiley et al. (2009) evaluated
students’ ability to learn about the mechanisms underlying
volcanic eruptions. The students were presented with texts from
both reliable and unreliable sources. The authors observed that
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the ability to evaluate the sources was a reliable predictor of the
development of an accurate mental model of the phenomena
(for similar findings, see Bråten et al., 2009). Furthermore,
previous research has established that individuals differ widely
in their ability to integrate and comprehend the information
in not only a single written or spoken text (Daneman and
Carpenter, 1983; Holmes, 1983; Palmer et al., 1985; Perfetti,
1985; Daneman, 1991; Otero and Kintsch, 1992; Hannon and
Daneman, 2001) but also multiple documents (e.g., Mason
et al., 2010; Griffin et al., 2012). For example, Griffin et al.
(2012) explored the effects of individual differences in both
capacity and dispositional constraints when learning about a
science topic from multiple documents. Following Stanovich
and West (1997), the authors reasoned that success on this
kind of task reflects individual differences pertaining to both
capacity such as working memory, reading skill, and vocabulary
knowledge, as well as dispositional characteristics such as an
appreciation of the importance of reasoning about evidence
when forming and revising beliefs. Griffin et al. (2012) found
that for seventh grade students, verbal ability (e.g., teachers’
judgments about a child’s reading skill) was the most reliable
predictor of learning outcomes in a multiple-document inquiry
task. Although, dispositional characteristics (e.g., scores on the
CLEAR Thinking Scale) explained a significant proportion of
variance in the learning outcomes, the effect was smaller than
for verbal ability. Research by Mason et al. (2010) arrived at
a similar finding. These authors observed that both reading
comprehension skills and beliefs about scientific knowledge
were significantly associated with the eighth-graders’ learning
about dinosaur extinction from multiple electronic sources.
Together these findings highlight that, although dispositional
characteristics are relevant when learning from multiple texts,
information processing ability might be more important.
Here, we explore the possibility that differences in readers’
verbal ability may also play an important role and perhaps
more important than the personality traits such as need for
cognition in moderating the effect of argument order when
formulating opinions from arguments in written text. For
example, individuals with low verbal ability may be less successful
at maintaining and integrating successively presented sides for
a given argument. As a result they may construct a better
representation of the most recent information, and fail to
integrate it adequately with the information they were exposed
to earlier. This would lead them to rely on the most recently
presented position, whether pro or con, when they need to form
their attitude toward an issue in question. In contrast, high
verbal ability individuals should be better able to integrate the
different perspectives and create a more balanced representation
of the pros and cons pertaining to a specific issue. Thus, when
formulating their opinions they would be able to rely on this
balanced representation. In turn, they would be able to form their
opinions based on the overall impression of the argument rather
than on the most recent position, and so should be generally
less susceptible to effects of presentation order in two-sided
argumentation. As recognized by Haugtvedt and Petty (1992),
although individuals scoring high on need for cognition are more
likely to engage in effortful information processing, they are not
always inclined to or do not have the required processing ability
to do so. Following the same argument, there is no reason for
individuals scoring low on need for cognition not to occasionally
engage in effortful information processing provided that they
have required processing ability to do so. Thus, it is possible that
verbal ability may play a more important role than the personality
traits such as need for cognition in moderating the effect of
argument order when individuals formulate their opinions from
arguments in written text.
The present research directly addresses the extent to which
readers’ sensitivity to presentation order interacts with individual
differences in verbal ability. In addition, it explores how verbal
ability relates to need for cognition in view of the previous
research addressing the relationship between need for cognition
and argument ordering. In the experiment, we manipulate the
order in which pro and con arguments were presented to
evaluate the effect on readers’ evaluations of these contrasting
perspectives. Furthermore, by using both need-for-cognition and
verbal ability scores, we provide a novel test of the extent to which
individual differences at the level of personality traits and at the
level of linguistic-cognitive processing can moderate potential
order effects.
Participants were asked to read passages containing four pro
and four con arguments on the topic of compulsory voting
for national elections and four pro and four con arguments
on the topic of genetic engineering in food production (see
Supplementary Materials for examples). A given participant
would read pros first for one of the topics and cons first
for the other topic. In this experiment we also assessed
participants’ attitudes toward each topic both before and after
they read the arguments. This was done to control for differences
in participants’ baseline attitudes toward the selected topics.
Furthermore, in this experiment individual differences in verbal
ability were assessed by combining scores on the Mill-Hill
Vocabulary Scale (Raven, 1965) with those from a global test
of reading comprehension ability, the Nelson-Denny (Brown
et al., 1981). Individual differences in need for cognition were
assessed using a scale developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982;
see also Cacioppo et al., 1984). The scale consists of 18 items
where individuals evaluate to what extent statements such as “I
find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours” serve
as accurate descriptions of themselves. Previous research has
suggested that individuals scoring high on this scale are naturally
inclined to engage in and enjoy effortful information-processing
activities involving a wide variety of topics (Cacioppo et al., 1996;
Petty et al., 2009).
If low verbal ability individuals are more likely to report
the most recently presented position to be the most compelling
whereas high verbal ability individuals are, in general, less
susceptible to the ordering of arguments, we should observe
recency effects for low verbal ability participants and no effect
of argument ordering for high verbal ability participants. On
the other hand, if need for cognition is indeed a consistent
moderator of order effects in two-sided argumentation, the
attitudes of participants scoring low on the need-for-cognition
measure should be biased toward the arguments presented last
(recency effect) whereas the attitudes of participants scoring high
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on the need-for-cognition measure should be in accordance with
the arguments presented first (primacy effect).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The participants were 32 female (n = 22) and male (n = 10)
first (n = 28), second (n = 2), third (n = 1) year undergraduate
and first year Ph.D. (n = 1) students recruited from the
University of Toronto Mississauga (mean age: 18.7 years, range:
17–41 years). All participants were fluent speakers of English.
Participants were paid $10 (n = 1) per hour or received course
credit (n = 31) for their participation. Participants were tested
individually in one session. Each session lasted approximately
1 h. The study was approved by the Social Sciences, Humanities
and Education Research Ethics Board at the University of
Toronto.
Pro and Con Arguments
The arguments used in the present experiment were adapted
from Sather (1999). The arguments were constructed so that they
formed four related pairs of pro and con statements regarding a
specific sub-issue to do with compulsory voting and four related
pairs of pro and con statements regarding a specific sub-issue
to do with genetic engineering (see Supplementary Materials for
the full list of arguments used in the current study). In other
words, within a given pair, the pro argument addressed an issue
for which the con argument served as a direct counterpoint (e.g.,
compulsory voting ensures that a victorious party represents the
views of the entire population vs. if compelled to vote, most
people will simply vote randomly, which would not ensure better
representation). This point-counterpoint structuring assured that
each specific position (whether pro or con) would eventually
be complemented by “the other side of the story” that directly
addressed the same sub-issue. The length of the sets of arguments
related to compulsory voting and genetic engineering was 589
and 565 words, respectively.
Procedure and Design
Upon arrival each participant was asked to read and sign a
consent form. Participants were told the study was designed to
examine the ability to learn from text. They were advised that the
experimenter would ask some questions about the text when they
finished reading.
Each participant read arguments relating to two separate
topics (compulsory voting and genetic engineering) and was
exposed to both presentation order conditions (between topics:
either pro-con then con-pro or con-pro then pro-con). The
order in which each topic and each presentation order condition
appeared was counterbalanced across participants. Each set of
four arguments was presented as a single “page” on a computer
screen. An important aspect of this within-participant design is
that across the experiment, each set of pro and con arguments
appeared in all experimental conditions an equal number of
times. In other words, each item with its particular characteristics
such as persuasiveness and readability contributed equally to
each experimental condition, allowing us to control for these
characteristics by the means of the experimental design.
Once participants advanced the page, they were not able
to go back (following the methodology used in past studies
such as Braasch et al., 2013). Also, participants completed an
attitude questionnaire both before and after reading the pro
and the con arguments for each topic. Post-reading attitude
scores were subtracted from pre-reading attitude scores to derive
a single attitude change score. After completing the attitude
questionnaire for each topic, participants performed a recall task.
Next, participants were asked to complete a prior knowledge
questionnaire for each topic as well as the Need for Cognition
Scale. The Need for Cognition Scale was administered in the
same session following Kassin et al. (1990) and Qiu and Wang
(2011). To assess verbal ability, participants completed both the
Mill-Hill Vocabulary test and the Nelson-Denny test of reading
comprehension (Form E of the Nelson-Denny test: Brown et al.,
1981). The Mill-Hill Vocabulary and Nelson-Denny test scores
were standardized and averaged to derive a single verbal ability
score for each participant.
Attitude Questionnaire
Participants’ attitudes toward compulsory voting were assessed
using nine seven-point semantic differential scales. Following
Petty et al. (2001), these scales were labeled bad-good,
wise-foolish, positive-negative, unfavorable-favorable, beneficial-
harmful, unpleasant-pleasant, fair-unfair, unnecessary-necessary,
and intelligent-stupid. Scales where low numbers indicated
positive attitude (e.g., intelligent-stupid) were reverse scored so
that higher scores always corresponded to more positive attitude.
Finally, responses to the scales before and after reading the
passages were averaged and subtracted to form one overall
attitude change score for each participant.
Recall Task
Participants were given a booklet for the recall task that stated
that the text discussed four issues regarding a respective topic
and presented pros and cons for each issue. The instructions then
asked participants to write down as much as they could remember
about the arguments discussed in the text. The booklet also
included a title for each issue (e.g., “Voter turnout,” “Balanced
representation,” “Personal liberties,” and “Affirming the privileges
for which our predecessors fought” in the case of arguments
regarding compulsory voting) on a separate page to serve as
memory cues. A single rater blind to the experimental conditions
evaluated the responses. The rater assigned a score of 0, 0.25, 0.5,
0.75, or 1 for each of the eight individual arguments depending
on how accurate and detailed a given participant’s response was.
For example, consider the following con argument regarding
compulsory voting:
(1) Large voter turnout does not automatically ensure that elected
officials are representative of the population as a whole. Some people
do not vote because they lack interest in the political process. Others
may be well-informed, but have no preference for any particular
candidate or party. If compelled to vote, these people will vote
randomly, which would not ensure that the outcome of the election
reflects opinions from all sectors of society.
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To obtain a score of 1 for this particular argument, participants
had to indicate four ideas in their answers: (1) some people
do not vote due to lack of interest in the political process,
(2) some people do not vote due to lack of confidence in the
political process, (3) when people who lack interest/confidence
vote, they will vote randomly, (4) because votes of disinterested
people are random, compulsory voting does not ensure better
representation. For each unreported idea, the score was reduced
by 0.25. Because each topic as a whole included eight arguments,
the highest possible score was 8. In addition, we derived an
additional recent-item recall measure by dividing the recall score
for the most recent set of arguments out of total recall score. Thus
this score measured any bias to recall the information primarily
from the most recent set of arguments.
Need for Cognition Scale
Participants were administered the short version of the Need
for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984). The scale includes
18 statements such as “I prefer simple to complex tasks” and
“Thinking is not my idea of fun.” Participants were required
to rate the extent to which each statement is characteristic of
them on a nine-point Likert scale. Half of the statements (e.g.,
“Thinking is not my idea of fun”) were reverse scored whereas the
other half (e.g., “I prefer simple to complex tasks”) were scored
regularly. Finally, responses to each statement were averaged to
form one overall need-for-cognition score for each participant.
Higher scores on this questionnaire corresponded to higher need
for cognition.
Mill-Hill Test of Vocabulary Knowledge
Participants were administered the Mill-Hill test of vocabulary
knowledge (Raven, 1965). There were 20 multiple-choice items
(e.g., fecund means [a] esculent, [b] profound, [c] sublime, [d]
optative, [e] prolific, [f] salic). Participants completed all 20 items
without any time restrictions. The total number of correctly
identified meanings out of 20 was recorded.
Nelson-Denny Test of Reading
Comprehension
Participants were administered the Nelson-Denny test, which
consists of eight prose passages and 36 multiple-choice questions.
Participants were given 20 min to read the passages and answer
the questions. The total number of correctly answered questions
within this interval was recorded.
Prior Knowledge Questionnaire
Participants were then administered a prior knowledge
questionnaire to assess how much they knew about the
topics of compulsory voting and genetic engineering prior
to participating in the study. They were asked two questions:
(1) “How much did you know about the idea of compulsory
voting/genetic engineering before you came in to do this study?”
and (2) “Have you considered the advantages and disadvantages
of compulsory voting/genetic engineering before you came in
to do this study?” Participants were required to indicate their
answer on a seven-point Likert scale (e.g., 1 – “I have never heard
about the idea of compulsory voting before” and 7 – “I had a
lot of prior knowledge about the idea of compulsory voting”).
Responses to each question were averaged together to form
participant’s prior knowledge score for each topic.
RESULTS
Data Analysis
The recall and attitude change scores were submitted to a series
of linear mixed effects models with participants and items as
crossed, independent, random effects implemented in package
lme4 of the statistical software R 2.15.2 (Bates et al., 2012;
R Core Team, 2012; for a discussion on the implementation and
advantages of such models over traditional by-participant and by-
item analyses based on quasi-F tests, see Baayen, 2008; Baayen
et al., 2008; Barr et al., 2013). Unlike traditional hierarchical
or multilevel models, the mixed effects models applied in the
present study do not require random effects to be nested. As
suggested by Barr et al. (2013), in all models, we started by
including all random effects supported by the design. However, if
a maximal model did not converge, the random effects structure
was simplified following the “best path” procedure outlined by
Barr et al. (2013) until a particular model converged. Main effects
and interactions were evaluated performing likelihood ratio tests,
in which the deviance (-2LL) of a model containing the fixed
effect is compared to another model without the effect in question
but is otherwise identical in random effects structure. For the
fixed effects, we report the regression coefficient, the standard
error, χ2 and the corresponding p-values (for the verbal ability,
need for cognition, recall, recent item recall, prior knowledge, and
attitude change score descriptive statistics, see Table 1).
Association between Individual
Differences and Recall
Before turning to the results pertaining to the main focus of the
study (attitude formation) we first confirm that our experimental
task and the number of participants allows us to replicate more
established findings regarding the association between verbal
ability, need for cognition, and memory for text information.
First of all, we investigated the relationship between the Mill-
Hill Vocabulary and Nelson-Denny test scores because they were
used to derive a single verbal ability score for each participant.
As expected, there was a significant association between the two
measures, r = 0.49, p = 0.005. In addition, consistent with
previous research (e.g., Tidwell et al., 2000; Fleischhauer et al.,
2010), there was a significant positive correlation between verbal
ability and need for cognition measures, r = 0.39, p = 0.027.
The internal consistency coefficient of the Nelson-Denny test
was 0.67 (Kuder–Richardson formula 21) and 0.60 (Kuder–
Richardson formula 20) for the Mill-Hill Vocabulary test. The
internal consistency coefficient of the need-for-cognition scale
was 0.89 (Cronbach’s Alpha).
Further, to investigate how the individual differences measures
are related to memory, recall scores were first modeled as a
function of verbal ability and topic order (whether a set of
arguments appeared first or second in the experiment) and the
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TABLE 1 | Mean, standard deviation, and ranges for the verbal ability, need
for cognition, recall, recent item recall, prior knowledge, and attitude
change scores.
Measure Mean SD Observed range Possible range
Pro-con
Recall
Pro 1.47 0.75 0.25–3.50 0–4
Con 1.48 0.80 0–3.25 0–4
Total 2.95 1.42 0.25–6 0–8
Recent item recall 0.48 0.14 0–0.71 0–1
Prior knowledge 4.14 1.56 1–6.5 1–7
Attitude
Pre-reading 4.63 1.16 1.56–7 1–7
Post-reading 4.18 1.29 1.56–7 1–7
Attitude change −0.45 0.75 −2.67–0.78 −6–6
Con-pro
Recall
Pro 1.59 0.82 0.25–3.25 0–4
Con 1.13 0.98 0–3.25 0–4
Total 2.72 1.67 0.25–6.50 0–8
Recent item recall 0.66 0.20 0.33–1 0–1
Prior knowledge 4.01 1.76 1–7 1–7
Attitude
Pre-reading 4.23 1.15 1–6 1–7
Post-reading 4.28 1.13 1.56–5.78 1–7
Attitude change 0.05 1.07 −3.22–2.89 −6–6
Across conditions
Nelson-Denny 22.72 4.92 14–34 0–36
Mill-Hill 11.06 2.29 7–15 0–20
Need for cognition 5.84 1.13 3.28–7.72 1–9
Recall
Pro 1.53 0.78 0.25–3.50 0–4
Con 1.31 0.91 0–3.25 0–4
Total 2.84 1.54 0.25–6.50 0–8
Recent item recall 0.57 0.19 0–1 0–1
Prior knowledge 4.08 1.65 1–7 1–7
Attitude
Pre-reading 4.43 1.16 1–7 1–7
Post-reading 4.23 1.21 1.56–7 1–7
Attitude change −0.20 0.95 −3.22–2.89 −6–6
interaction of these two variables (Table 2, Model 1). In addition,
the model included prior knowledge as a covariate. The analysis
revealed that there was a main effect of the order in which the
arguments appeared in the experiment, β = 0.53, SE = 0.22,
χ2(1) = 6.05, p = 0.014. This indicated that participants recalled
more arguments about the topic that appeared second in the
experiment (first topic: 2.57 vs. second topic: 3.10). There
also was a significant main effect of verbal ability, β = 0.73,
SE = 0.27, χ2(1) = 6.99, p = 0.008. This reflects the fact that as
verbal ability scores increased, so did recall scores. In addition,
the interaction between the two variables was not significant
(p = 0.788). Finally, there was no main effect of prior knowledge
(p= 0.979).
A model with recall as the dependent measure and need
for cognition, the order (first, second) in which a debate topic
TABLE 2 | The mixed-effects regression models with Recall as dependent
variable.
Effect β SE χ2 (df) p
Model 1
Prior Knowledge < 0.01 0.16 <0.01 (1) 0.979
Topic Order 0.53 0.22 6.05 (1) 0.014∗
Verbal Ability 0.73 0.27 6.99 (1) 0.008∗
Topic Order × Verbal Ability −0.06 0.24 0.07 (1) 0.788
Model 2
Prior Knowledge −0.02 0.14 0.02 (1) 0.880
Topic Order 0.52 0.20 6.20 (1) 0.013∗
Need For Cognition 0.18 0.22 0.63 (1) 0.427
Topic Order × Need For Cognition 0.27 0.17 2.42 (1) 0.120
Model 3
Prior Knowledge −0.01 0.15 <0.01 (1) 0.965
Topic Order 0.53 0.21 6.54 (1) 0.011∗
Verbal Ability 0.74 0.33 5.46 (1) 0.020∗
Need For Cognition −0.04 0.24 0.03 (1) 0.855
Verbal Ability × Need For Cognition 0.03 0.33 0.01 (1) 0.923
Topic Order × Verbal Ability −0.23 0.25 0.93 (1) 0.334
Topic Order × Need For Cognition 0.34 0.19 3.26 (1) 0.071
∗represents significant results at 5% level of significance.
appeared in the experiment, and their interaction as predictors as
well as prior knowledge as a covariate (Table 2, Model 2) revealed
a significant main effect of debate topic order, β= 0.52, SE= 0.20,
χ2(1) = 6.20, p = 0.013. However, there was no main effect of
prior knowledge, need for cognition, or an interaction between
need for cognition and topic order (ps > 0.05).
Next, a model with recall as the dependent measure, prior
knowledge as a covariate and verbal ability, need for cognition,
topic order, and three two-way interactions between the latter
three variables (Table 2, Model 3) revealed a significant
main effect of debate topic order, β = 0.53, SE = 0.21,
χ2(1)= 6.54, p= 0.011. This confirmed that participants recalled
more arguments about the topic that appeared second in the
experiment and reflects the fact that participants improved at the
memory task as they became more familiar with the experiment.
There also was a significant main effect of verbal ability, β= 0.74,
SE = 0.33, χ2(1) = 5.46, p = 0.020. This reflects the fact that
as verbal ability scores increased, so did recall scores even after
controlling for need for cognition. However, there was no main
effect of prior knowledge, need for cognition, nor were any
interactions significant (ps > 0.05).
Recent item recall was also modeled as a function of verbal
ability, whether a set of arguments appeared first or second
in the experiment, the interaction of these two variables and
prior knowledge as a covariate (Table 3, Model 1). The analysis
revealed that there was a main effect of verbal ability on recent
item recall: β = −0.73, SE = 0.35, χ2(1) = 4.43, p = 0.035. As
shown in Figure 1, as verbal ability increased, the proportion of
recent information recalled decreased. In other words, low verbal
ability participants tended to recall comparatively more recent
information from the presented arguments whereas high verbal
ability participants tended to recall information from the earlier
and later arguments more equally. Thus, participants with higher
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TABLE 3 | The mixed-effects regression models with Recent Item Recall
as dependent variable.
Effect β SE χ2 (df) p
Model 1
Prior Knowledge −0.55 0.40 2.58 (1) 0.108
Topic Order −0.90 0.63 2.36 (1) 0.125
Verbal Ability 0.73 0.35 4.43 (1) 0.035∗
Topic Order × Verbal Ability 0.12 0.70 0.02 (1) 0.895
Model 2
Prior Knowledge −0.60 0.41 2.72 (1) 0.099
Topic Order −0.92 0.66 2.27 (1) 0.132
Need For Cognition 0.06 0.28 0.08 (1) 0.783
Topic Order × Need For Cognition −0.01 0.55 <0.01 (1) 0.963
Model 3
Prior Knowledge −0.63 0.40 3.12 (1) 0.077
Topic Order −0.93 0.63 2.66 (1) 0.103
Verbal Ability −0.84 0.41 4.48 (1) 0.034∗
Need For Cognition 0.30 0.31 1.10 (1) 0.294
Verbal Ability × Need For Cognition −0.15 0.42 0.15 (1) 0.699
Topic Order × Verbal Ability 0.13 0.77 0.02 (1) 0.894
Topic Order × Need For Cognition −0.04 0.59 <0.01 (1) 0.997
∗represents significant results at 5% level of significance.
verbal ability scores tended to recall the arguments in a more
balanced way than did the low verbal ability participants. The
model did not reveal any other significant effects (ps > 0.05).
In addition, a model with recent item recall as the dependent
measure and need for cognition, debate topic order, and Need
for Cognition× Topic Order interaction as predictor variables as
well as prior knowledge as a covariate (Table 3, Model 2) revealed
no significant main effects or interactions (ps > 0.05). Thus,
increases in need for cognition were not significantly associated
with changes in the proportion of recent information recalled
from the two texts.
Finally, a model with recent item recall as the dependent
measure, prior knowledge as a covariate and verbal ability, need
for cognition, the order in which a debate topic appeared in the
experiment, and three two-way interactions between the latter
three variables (Table 3, Model 3) revealed a main effect of verbal
ability, β = −0.84, SE = 0.41, χ2(1) = 4.48, p = 0.034. This
confirmed that the relationship between verbal ability and recent
item recall illustrated in Figure 1 remains significant even after
controlling for need for cognition. Finally, no other main effect
or interaction was significant (ps > 0.05).
Overall, the relationship between the individual differences
and the memory measures suggest that verbal ability is more
successful than need for cognition at predicting text recall
performance (cf. Cacioppo et al., 1996; Kardash and Noel,
2000). Furthermore, the analyses provide evidence that increases
in verbal ability are associated with more balanced recall of
information presented at the beginning and at the end of each
text. This is, however, not the case for the need for cognition
measure.
Individual Differences and Attitudes
The mean attitude change score for all participants was −0.20
(SD= 0.57,−0.17, and−0.23 for compulsory voting and genetic
engineering topics respectively). This suggests that, overall,
participants reported a slightly more negative attitude toward
the issues after reading the arguments than they did before
reading the arguments, however, this pattern was not statistically
significant (p > 0.05).
To investigate the effect of individual differences and
presentation order effects on attitude change, attitude change
scores were first submitted to a linear mixed effects model
with prior knowledge as covariate and argument presentation
order (pro-con vs. con-pro), verbal ability, and Presentation
Order × Verbal Ability interaction as predictors (Table 4,
Model 1). This analysis revealed a significant Presentation
Order × Verbal Ability interaction, β = 0.63, SE = 0.27,
χ2(1) = 5.75, p = 0.016. To disentangle this interaction, we
used the coding of categorical and continuous variables as well
as structuring of the model proposed by West et al. (1996;
see also Cohen and Cohen, 1983) to test interactions between
categorical and continuous variables. As illustrated in Figure 2,
high verbal ability participants had similar attitude change scores
irrespective of argument presentation order, p > 0.05. However,
low verbal ability participants were more likely to develop more
positive attitudes following the reading of the arguments in the
con-pro condition compared to the pro-con condition, β = 1.04,
SE = 0.32, χ2(1) = 6.52, p = 0.011. In other words, low verbal
FIGURE 1 | Relationship between verbal ability and recent item recall. The proportion scores reflecting recent item recall were logit transformed before
entering them into the correlation analysis, however, we plot raw proportion values for easier interpretation.
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TABLE 4 | The mixed-effects regression models with Attitude Change as
dependent variable.
Effect β SE χ2 (df) p
Model 1
Prior Knowledge −0.09 0.14 0.44 (1) 0.508
Presentation Order −0.50 0.22 3.83 (1) 0.051
Verbal Ability −0.13 0.13 1.07 (1) 0.300
Presentation Order × Verbal Ability 0.63 0.27 5.75 (1) 0.016∗
Presentation Order When Verbal
Ability is High
0.05 0.32 0.02 (1) 0.884
Presentation Order When Verbal
Ability is Low
−1.04 0.32 6.52 (1) 0.011∗
Model 2
Prior Knowledge −0.16 0.14 1.11 (1) 0.293
Presentation Order −0.49 0.23 3.67 (1) 0.056
Recall −0.04 0.08 0.32 (1) 0.574
Presentation Order × Recall 0.14 0.16 0.85 (1) 0.356
Model 3
Prior Knowledge −0.11 0.15 0.60 (1) 0.438
Presentation Order −0.56 0.26 3.62 (1) 0.057
Recent Item Recall −0.03 0.06 0.23 (1) 0.631
Presentation Order × Recent Item
Recall
−0.20 0.13 2.34 (1) 0.126
Model 4
Prior Knowledge −0.14 0.14 1.00 (1) 0.318
Presentation Order −0.50 0.23 4.97 (1) 0.026∗
Need For Cognition −0.16 0.10 2.68 (1) 0.101
Presentation Order × Need For
Cognition
0.10 0.21 0.24 (1) 0.623
Model 5
Prior Knowledge −0.07 0.14 0.24 (1) 0.623
Presentation Order −0.50 0.22 3.99 (1) 0.046∗
Verbal Ability −0.08 0.15 0.30 (1) 0.582
Need For Cognition −0.14 0.11 1.67 (1) 0.197
Verbal Ability × Need For Cognition 0.07 0.15 0.24 (1) 0.622
Presentation Order × Verbal Ability 0.69 0.29 6.15 (1) 0.013∗
Presentation Order × Need For
Cognition
−0.10 0.22 0.23 (1) 0.632
∗represents significant results at 5% level of significance.
ability participants showed a recency effect, whereas high verbal
ability participants showed neither a recency nor a primacy effect.
Given that verbal ability was significantly associated with
recall and recent item recall, we considered the possibility that
these measures might also moderate the effect of presentation
order. However, a linear mixed effects model that included
prior knowledge, presentation order, recall and Presentation
Order× Recall (Table 4, Model 2) revealed only a marginal main
effect of presentation order, β = 0.49, SE = 0.23, χ2(1) = 3.67,
p = 0.056, and no other main effects or interactions. Similarly,
a model with prior knowledge, presentation order, recent item
recall, and Presentation Order× Recent Item Recall as predictors
(Table 4, Model 3) also revealed only a marginal main effect of
presentation order, β = 0.56, SE = 0.26, χ2(1) = 3.62, p = 0.057.
Thus, text memory did not appear to moderate the effect of
presentation order in terms of attitude change. We discuss this
in more detail in the Section “Discussion.”
In another linear mixed effects model, prior knowledge,
presentation order, need for cognition, and Presentation
Order × Need For Cognition interactions were entered as
predictor variables (Table 4, Model 4). The model revealed
only a main effect of presentation order, β = 0.50, SE = 0.23,
χ2(1) = 4.97, p = 0.026. This reflected the fact that, overall,
attitude change was more negative in pro-con than con-pro
condition. Importantly, there was no significant Presentation
Order × Need For Cognition interaction (p > 0.05). Thus,
contrary to previous studies (e.g., Kassin et al., 1990; Haugtvedt
and Petty, 1992; Qiu and Wang, 2011), we failed to observe
different order effects on attitude change for participants that
varied as a function of their need-for-cognition scores.
Finally, we modeled attitude change scores as a function of
prior knowledge, presentation order, need for cognition, verbal
ability, Presentation Order × Need For Cognition, Presentation
Order × Verbal Ability, and Verbal Ability × Need For
Cognition (Table 4, Model 5). The model revealed a main effect
of presentation order, β = 0.49, SE = 0.22, χ2(1) = 3.99,
p= 0.046. This reflected the fact that, overall, attitude change was
more negative in pro-con than con-pro condition. Importantly,
the interaction between verbal ability and presentation order
illustrated in Figure 2 remained significant, β = 0.69, SE = 0.29,
χ2(1) = 6.15, p = 0.013, even when controlling for the need-for-
cognition scores. None of the other main effects or interactions
were significant (ps > 0.05).
Although we did not find an interaction between presentation
order and need for cognition, the results suggest that verbal
ability is a significant moderator of primacy and recency effects
in two-sided argumentation. More specifically, low verbal ability
individuals, perhaps due to their poorer text integration skills,
showed a recency effect. However, high verbal ability individuals
formed their opinions independent of the argument presentation
order. This can be explained on the assumption that high verbal
ability participants are able to effectively integrate different ideas
presented in the text and rely less on the most recent information
when reporting their attitudes. The assertion that high verbal
ability participants are more effective at integrating different
ideas presented in the text than low verbal ability participants
was supported by the significant relationship between verbal
ability and recall measures. However, in the current recall task
participants were reminded that the text discussed four issues
regarding a particular topic and presented pros and cons for each
issue as well as indicated a title for each issue. In other words, the
recall task provided a structure for the information to be recalled
which might not reflect the memory representation of the text
at the moment the attitudes were probed. Thus, it may not be
entirely surprising that performance on the current recall task did
not moderate the effect of presentation order on attitude change.
DISCUSSION
People often are exposed to differing opinions and viewpoints
in written materials such as magazines, newspapers, and books.
Research to date has suggested that presentation order as well
as need for cognition (or the general tendency for people
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FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the interaction between presentation order and verbal ability with respect to attitude change.
to engage in effortful information-processing activities) are
important factors influencing the way readers deal with these
differing viewpoints when formulating their opinions (e.g., Petty
et al., 2001). However, in the current study we also examined
whether and how verbal ability (individual differences at the
cognitive level, relating to the comprehension and integration of
text information) may moderate effects of presentation order on
attitude formation.
In the current study, we utilized a within-participant
presentation order manipulation in which all participants read
opposing arguments on two topics—compulsory voting and
genetic engineering. For all participants, pros were presented
first for one of the topics and cons were presented first for
the other topic. Furthermore, attitudes toward each topic were
assessed both before and after reading the sets of pro and con
arguments. Consistent with a number of previous studies (e.g.,
Cacioppo et al., 1986; Kardash and Noel, 2000), verbal ability was
a better predictor of text recall than was need for cognition. In
addition, as verbal ability scores increased, so did the likelihood
that arguments drawn from each of the two opposing positions
rather than just the most recent position will be recalled. Together
these results demonstrate that readers’ ability to process and
comprehend text information is more critical for explaining
their ability to encode and/or retrieve this information than
their tendency to enjoy information processing. More important,
the analyses of the attitude change revealed that there was no
interaction between presentation order and need for cognition.
Thus, contrary to previous literature (e.g., Kassin et al., 1990;
Haugtvedt and Petty, 1992; Qiu and Wang, 2011), in the current
study we failed to observe the pattern whereby individuals
with high need-for-cognition are influenced more by the first-
presented side of an argument compared to the second, whereas
those scoring low in need for cognition are persuaded more by
the most recent argument.
There are several possibilities for why our findings do not
reflect this interaction between presentation order and need for
cognition. First, as recognized by Haugtvedt and Petty (1992),
although individuals scoring high on need for cognition are more
likely to engage in effortful information processing, they are not
always inclined to do so. Thus, it is possible that, in the present
study, participants scoring high on need for cognition simply
did not spontaneously engage in greater information processing.
Another possibility is that interaction between presentation order
and need for cognition in previous studies was observed due
to the specific nature of the pro and con arguments used.
In Qiu and Wang (2011), for example, negative and positive
reviews were based on different aspects of the product (e.g., short
battery life and good appearance, respectively) and were relatively
short whereas Haugtvedt and Petty (1992) used arguments that
differed in “strength” (e.g., strong vs. weak). In the present
study, after reading one set of arguments readers encountered a
set of point-for-point counterarguments that directly addressed
each of the pros or cons read previously. The symmetry in the
structure of the argument may encourage the perception that
the last-presented perspective strongly rebuffs the arguments
presented first irrespective of the tendency to engage in effortful
information processing. Thus, one outstanding question that
could be addressed in future research is the extent to which
need for cognition is an important moderator of presentation
order effects across different kinds of textual materials. Another
possibility is that the interaction between need for cognition
and presentation order was not observed due to a relatively
small sample size employed in the current study. However, it is
important to note that this sample was sufficient for replicating
a number of previously well-established findings related to
associations between the need for cognition, verbal ability, and
text recall (for an extensive discussion see the meta-analysis by
Cacioppo et al., 1996).
Interestingly, an interaction between presentation order and
verbal ability in terms of readers’ attitude change was significant.
Specifically, high verbal ability participants had similar attitude
change scores irrespective of presentation order whereas low
verbal ability participants were more likely to report more
positive attitudes following the reading of the arguments in the
con-pro condition compared to the pro-con condition (a recency
effect). These results suggest that low verbal ability individuals,
perhaps due to poor text integration skills and text memory,
formed their attitudes based on the most available (recent)
information. In contrast, high verbal ability individuals, perhaps
due to their superior ability to effectively integrate different ideas
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presented in text and their superior and more balanced memory
for earlier- and later-encountered text, rely equally on earlier
and more recent information when reporting their attitudes.
This notion is indirectly supported by the observed relationship
between the verbal ability and memory measures. However, we do
recognize several limitations of the recall task used in the current
study. The task probed for recall after participants indicated
their attitudes and were reminded that the text discussed four
issues regarding compulsory voting and presented pros and cons
for each issue along with their titles. Thus, the task provided a
type of scaffolding for the information to be recalled after the
attitudes were formed. Consequently, the information recalled by
the participants in the current task might not straightforwardly
reflect the memory representation of the text at the moment
the attitudes were formed. This could explain why performance
on the current recall measures did not moderate the effect of
presentation order on attitude change. One question for future
research is whether free recall, which provides less scaffolding,
more accurately reflects memory representation of the text at
the moment when the attitudes are formed and probed. If so,
this recall measure should moderate order effects in attitude
formation.
In addition, it is worth noting that readers in the current
experiments did not have a possibility to go back to previously
read arguments. Hence, it is unclear whether verbal ability
would serve as a moderator of presentation order when
readers are allowed to selectively reread portions of the
text. For example, lower verbal ability individuals may be
more likely to engage into rereading and more strategic
comparison of the material to compensate for their inferior
ability to remember and integrate text information. Furthermore,
we recognize that verbal ability is a multidimensional
construct involving but not limited to previous experience and
working memory capacity. We leave it for further research
to explore whether any of these dimensions underlie the
observed interaction between verbal ability and presentation
order.
Together, the present findings illustrate the importance of
incorporating individual differences measures that reflect the
ability to understand and integrate ideas presented in a written or
spoken discourse into attitude and attitude formation research.
Such cognitive skills have received relatively little attention
compared to personality attributes such as need for cognition.
As observed in the present study, verbal ability was a reliable
moderator of presentation order effects on attitude change. We
are not suggesting that cognitive ability alone can account for
or subsume previously observed effects of personality traits on
attitude formation and change. Nevertheless, it is our hope
that differences in the ability to understand and integrate ideas
presented in a written or spoken discourse will receive the
attention they deserve in future research in this area.
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